| [00:00.00]Thawing of the Cold War [00:02.51]—the 1970's to 2001 [00:05.14]American Cold War policy ensued [00:09.08]until the early 1970's, [00:11.15]when some major changes [00:12.58]in thinking were inaugurated. [00:14.11]Communist China's entry to the United Nations [00:16.95]was a setback for the United States. [00:19.47]The Vietnam War was not going well. [00:22.07]In the early 70s, American President Nixon, [00:26.56]the archconservative and anti-communist president, [00:29.40]up to that point, [00:31.48]was preparing to visit China [00:32.79]and the Soviet Union. [00:33.88]Why would an American president visit these enemies? [00:36.84]The Americans came to the realization [00:39.46]that the development of good relations [00:41.98]with its counterparts in the communist [00:43.73]world was necessary. [00:45.59]A forthcoming, more pragmatic approach to [00:48.65]foreign policy with China was to be [00:49.07]a departure from the adverse ideological approach. [00:54.00]The United States had lost solid backing [00:56.85]from traditional supporters, [00:58.26]as illustrated by Communist China's [01:00.46]entry into the United Nations. [01:02.21]The question as to whether [01:04.61]Nationalist China or the People's Republic of China [01:07.24]should hold China's permanent Security Council seat, [01:10.41]was a topic of much discussion [01:12.82]and debate for years. [01:14.35]For many countries, [01:16.21]the idea of ignoring [01:17.74]one third of the world's population [01:19.38]at the UN was difficult to rationalize. [01:21.79]This debate ensued until 1971, [01:25.62]when the Peoples Republic of China [01:28.02]finally displaced Nationalist China [01:30.32]at the United Nations, [01:31.64]including the permanent seat, [01:33.16]originally held by Nationalist China [01:35.35]in the Security Council. [01:36.89]A baffled United States [01:38.97]could no longer persuade nor [01:40.93]intimidate the majority of the countries [01:43.01]in the UN General Assembly to [01:45.10]keep Communist China out of the UN. [01:47.17]The United States had little choice [01:49.69]but to eventually extend official recognition [01:52.75]to the Peoples Republic of China. [01:54.61]The war-weary American people [01:57.35]were no longer supporting the war [01:59.31]in Vietnam and no longer eagerly supporting [02:01.94]traditional foreign policy. [02:03.69]A major scandal(Watergate), [02:06.86]that would rock the Nixon Administration [02:08.94]to the resultant resignation of the president, [02:11.02]was about to be disclosed. [02:12.66]Practical solutions were needed [02:14.74]for practical problems. [02:16.27]Peaceful coexistence meant [02:18.79]finding some common ground [02:20.54]on which to activate [02:21.63]international trust and cooperation. [02:23.82]Nixon's consecutive predecessors, [02:26.44]Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, [02:28.97]and Johnson would have rolled over [02:31.37]in their graves if they [02:32.90]could have seen these changes. [02:33.43]These changes would have appeared alien, [02:36.39]contradictory or even contrived, [02:38.68]to them and their contemporaries. [02:40.87]Presidents Ford, Reagan, Bush, [02:44.48]and Clinton saw the need to keep [02:46.88]communication channels open with China. [02:48.96]Americans finally realized that [02:51.22]they could no longer [02:52.54]keep down a sleeping giant. [02:54.18]No longer a Paper Tiger, [02:56.04]China was a reality, [02:57.57]and was entitled to an important place [02:59.97]in world decisionmaking venues. [03:02.16]In the 1980's following the Cultural Revolution [03:06.21]and the death of Mao Tsetung, [03:08.40]China's outlook on the world changed dramatically. [03:11.02]Deng Xiaopeng's reforms were [03:13.65]to bring China closer to being [03:15.07]a major world partner in international trade [03:17.48]and the development of world markets. [03:19.67]This was capped with its admission [03:22.18]to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001. [03:26.89]China has been most willing to comply [03:29.51]with all of the regulations of the WTO. [03:31.92]Americans have only [03:33.78]half-heartedly opposed China's entry, [03:35.42]by unfairly using “human rights” [03:37.72]as a distraction to perhaps disguise [03:40.13]other international pressures. [03:41.88]However, the United States, [03:44.62]for a couple of decades, [03:46.14]already had major, politically discreet, [03:48.99]vested economic interests in China [03:51.07]that it could not afford [03:52.71]to deny or jeopardize. [03:54.13]In 1998, China signed [03:56.98]a Permanent Normal Trading Relations agreement [03:59.71]with the United States, [04:03.43]the prelude to the former's entry into the WTO. [04:03.97]President Clinton, who visited China in 1998, [04:08.01]had essentially paid lip service [04:09.87]to Congressional pressure to push [04:11.41]the human rights issues with China. [04:13.15]Except for the occasional irritating crisis [04:16.10]in recent years, such as [04:17.86]the spy plane incident off the island [04:19.61]of Hainan in April 2001, [04:22.02]Sino-American relations have been cordial [04:24.53]but cautious. The consensus seems to be, [04:27.38]that China's destiny as a major international force [04:30.77]in the 21th century, seems reasonably assured. |
| 课程名称 | 老师 | 课时 | 试听 | 报名 | 学费 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 大学英语四级精讲班 | 严邵阳 | 56 | 试听 | 报名 | ￥200 |
| 四级425速成--听力 | 欧 文 | 8 | 试听 | 报名 | ￥80 |
| 四级425速成--阅读 | 欧 文 | 14 | 试听 | 报名 | ￥90 |
| 四级425速成--综合 | 欧 文 | 13 | 试听 | 报名 | ￥80 |
| 四级425速成--写作 | 欧 文 | 16 | 试听 | 报名 | ￥90 |
| 四级经典历年真题 | 欧 文 | 10 | 试听 | 报名 | ￥80 |
| 大学英语六级听力 | 齐方炜 | 7 | 试听 | 报名 | ￥100 |
| 大学英语六级阅读 | 齐方炜 | 7 | 试听 | 报名 | ￥100 |
| 大学英语六级写作 | 欧 文 | 14 | 试听 | 报名 | ￥100 |
| 大学英语六级新题型 | 欧 文 | 15 | 试听 | 报名 | ￥100 |
| 大学英语六级词汇 | 欧 文 | 15 | 试听 | 报名 | ￥100 |
| 大学英语六级模拟题 | 欧 文 | 5(赠) | 无 | 报名 | ￥50 |
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